Is a Happy New Year Possible for 2016?

In April 2014 I wrote:   Stand by for the next UK crash! ETA 2016

I didn’t use my crystal ball which has never proved very reliable, in any case, when it comes to forecasting football scores or racing results. The reasoning was based  on the rate of fall in the financial position of the UK private domestic sector. It was obvious, then, that serious private sector debt problems would start to arise in mid to late 2015 if government policies carried on as they were.

Two recent articles by Owen Jones in the Guardian and Nigel Morris in the Independent  bear this out. Government policies have indeed been carried on as they were.

There is a very real danger of an economic crash as Owen Jones argues although he doesn’t have quite the right explanation. It’s really not much to do with the need for increased industrial productivity. The productivity of  UK and European industry is higher than it has ever been. Yet the economic problems are worse than they have been since the 30’s. Clearly Owen Jones, much as we might admire his political stance,  is barking up the wrong tree.

Simply, if the UK wants to run a 5% of GDP deficit in its Current Account Balance of Payments, someone has to fund that by borrowing. Usually it is government which has assumed that role but increasingly the burden is being shifted onto the Private Domestic sector.

It may work in the short term but soon the private sector will be increasingly unable to raise the necessary loans especially if there is a fear of higher interest rates, and a general credit crunch in the economy. The words ‘credit crunch’ started to become a cliche of all 2008 financial commentary  just prior to the GFC. We are starting to hear them again on a more regular basis.

It’s not looking good!

PS/Edit

The graphical basis of my concern. A modified screen shot from Neil Wilson’s blog “3poken”.

Is Government Spending Already by PQE?

We can think that all spending by government is already by the creation of new money, which is the general understanding of PQE (otherwise known as  Overt Monetary Financing of Government), using the concept that money is an IOU of a sovereign currency issuing government.

So, just as you or I have no use for our own IOUs, we tear them up when we get them back, neither has government. All money collected  in the form of taxation or in bond sales is simply shredded. Destroyed -either physically or digitally. When govt spends, it does so by issuing new IOUs. ie Issuing new money.

So what is the point of taxation? It’s to prevent high inflation as has already been mentioned in previous posts.

And the point of selling gilts (bonds)? It is to set longer term interest rates. Generally speaking: The more that are sold by auction, the lower their price, and the higher their yield. The higher their yield the higher are longer term interest rates.

If Government wants lower interest rates in the longer term it should sell fewer gilts, yet still create as many new IOUs, as many new ££, as it needs for spending purposes. Its spending decisions have to be such that they won’t produce too much inflation, of course,  which would require the raising of taxes. The balance between spending and taxation remains the subject of political debate as always.

A better idea might be to stop selling gilts completely and allow savers, ie the hitherto bond purchasers, to put their money on account with the BoE ( which is best considered as part of Treasury) and set the interest rate payable just as a high street bank would set the interest to us on our longer term savings. Short term interest rates are already set this way so the concept, and practice, just needs to be extended to include all savings. The interest rate would probably be higher for a longer deposit period, again as we might expect from our own bank.

And what about the exchange rate?

If the government offers lower interest rates the £ might be expected to fall, and higher rates will probably cause it to rise. If we stay with the idea of selling gilts, and stick with the concept that PQE  is somehow different,  we can say there will be less need for the government to ‘borrow’  and therefore less need to pay out interest.

This will have the same effect on the exchange rate as directly reducing interest rates.  It is just looking at the process from a different perspective.

PQE, as is conventionally understood, could be part of the government’s exchange rate strategy. That is if it wants one, and that could be the subject of another discussion! If it wants a lower pound, it does more PQE. A higher £ means less PQE. It depends on what sort of trade deficit we want to run. If we are happy to run a high deficit, and there is no reason why we shouldn’t, we can keep the pound high, but if we want to reduce it we will need a lower £.

Goodbye to £5 and £10 notes?

The  Bank of England’s chief economist Andy Haldane’s speech. caused some raised  eyebrows recently. It sounds like he knows we’re in for some tough economic times ahead. Things are so desperate that it  might require the abolition of cash in the economy!  People will be forced to hold money in banks and see its value dwindle.

As Andy Haldane has put it “A more radical proposal still would be to remove the ZLB (zero lower bound) constraint entirely by abolishing paper currency.”

We could perhaps begrudgingly say Andy Haldane has shown political and economic courage in saying this. If we are being charitable we could credit Mr Haldane for highlighting the intellectual bankruptcy of most mainstream modern economic thinking. If we wished to be less charitable we’d have to say the idea of abolishing cash is about as stupid as it gets!

I hope it is the former and that cash won’t be abolished. But this isn’t the first time we’ve heard this silly argument argument from monetarist economists and in particular from Kenneth Rogoff. See  here  and  here. That they feel the need to make it shows they still haven’t really grasped that interest rates can’t have the controlling  effect they think they have on the wider economy.

When intelligent men like Rogoff and Haldane have silly ideas, political ideology is usually to blame. The main argument for banning cash, other than to hinder criminals and tax-dodgers, which is no stronger an argument now than it has ever been, is to facilitate sharply negative interest rates. But if we want to stimulate the economy, as we do right now, there’s an obvious and much easier alternative: ie loosen fiscal policy. Increase government spending and reduce levels of taxation.

The only reason to suggest something as outlandish as banning printed currency is that you believe this alternative to be impossible. Or, rather impossible according to one’s own political ideology.

Monetarism all sounds fine – superficially. When times are good interest rates are increased to slow the economy down. When times are bad they are lowered to stimulate lending and get it moving again. There’s no need for government to be involved at all. They can concentrate on balancing the books like any good business should.

Except that every stimulus leads to the build up of private debt in the economy. This build up slows down economic activity, and so we later have to have another reduction in interest rates. Then another and yet another after that . If we get it all wrong then there can even be a giant crash in the economy when those who’ve taken on too much private debt go bust and cause their creditors to go bust too.

So, eventually we arrive at the situation, as we have now, where interest rates in much of the western world  are close to zero and they need to go negative according to the theory to stimulate the economy again. Economists with more intelligence are saying “Whoa! There must be something wrong with the theory”. Others with less insight are saying “But this is just the special case of the zero lower bound” and those with no insight at all, or are stupefied by their own political ideology, are ploughing on regardless and calling for the abolition of cash!

Leaving aside the argument that many of us quite like the convenience of using cash, it’s much quicker than messing about with credit cards at the petrol station for example, it is a genuinely bad idea to go down the road of negative interest rates which will lead to an ever increasing build up of private debt in the economy.

Mainstream (ie Neo -Classical and Monetarist in outlook) economists didn’t spot the onset of the GFC because they didn’t  know where to look for the warning signals. The role of private debt in leading to booms and busts was denied. Expanding the “money supply” was the only standard remedy for stimulating economic activity and the risk of creating asset bubbles was largely ignored with disastrous consequences.

I may come back to the question of private debt in the economy later but for now I’ll just reference Prof Steve Keen’s excellent blog on the perils of debt deflation.

What is People’s Quantitative Easing?

PQE,  sometimes known as Overt Monetary Financing, is the process of creating new money, issued by the central bank in exchange for government bonds. This is then directly spent into the economy to stimulate economic activity. Whereas conventional Quantitative Easing is primarily to provide liquidity to banks and other financial institutions – Some might say it is to give them money which can create asset price bubbles, and other price distortions! – PQE is much simpler and free of many complications.  PQE  can be part of powerful fiscal policy to remedy the  problems of recession and depression.

Mention PQE, however, a term coined I believe by Richard Murphy, and it won’t be long before Zimbabwe and the Weimar Republic will be used as examples of why it’s not a good idea! That’s OTT, but nevertheless the objection of possible inflation needs to be addressed.

PQE could possibly cause inflation. All government spending, as with all spending, deficit or otherwise, carries an inflationary potential .

Deficit spending is necessary to keep the economy functioning when users of the currency wish to save some of it. Those who doubt that might just like to consider the very simple economy of a baby sitting circle. If everyone in the circle readily spent a token and received a night’s baby sitting in equal measure to their willingness to do a night’s baby sitting to receive a token, there’d be no problem at all. But, say, for whatever reason, some of the sitters decided to accumulate tokens. Fairly quickly there would be a shortage and the system would cease to function. There would be a demand, from those without tokens, that the baby sitting council should issue extra ones. Those with a stockpile of tokens would object, saying the “printing” of new tokens would devalue their existing tokens.

If the hoarders lent the tokens back to the council they could be pacified with some reward. Just as lenders of pounds to the government are pacified with a reward of extra pounds. But if the hoarders of the tokens saved them in a piggy bank and refused to lend them back, all the council could do would be to create new tokens and inject them into the system. This would be the equivalent of PQE.

Is one method more or less inflationary than the other? There’s not much in it. Arguably PQE would be less inflationary because there are no extra rewards needed. If the issuing of new tokens, by either method, was just enough to restart the system, not too much and not too little, then neither method would be inflationary.

So who are the hoarders in the real economy? The central banks of the big exporters are the biggest. The big exporters don’t want to spend all they earn by selling goods and services into the British economy. So they buy Government bonds and so effectively lend back their surplus tokens, or ££. The wealthy are the other main ‘culprits’. They tend to accumulate more ££ than they need.

But what if not everyone recycled their extra tokens back through the banking system? Suppose they kept hoards of cash in safes or bank deposit boxes? The government can’t borrow those back. All it can do is create some new tokens. PQE in other words.

The government can’t know just how fast money is moving or if lots of it is being stored this way. What it can expect is the combination of low interest rates and low inflation will make it more attractive for many users of currency who may be engaging in illegal, or borderline, transactions and so wish to hide their finances, will  to store their cash this way.  However, Government can easily monitor inflation. If it is engaging in PQE and inflation starts to be a problem it needs to back off. Alternatively if it’s not a problem it can do a bit more. The government needs to be careful, but shouldn’t be so scared of the idea that it doesn’t even try it out.

Muddled Thinking Watch #7: Chuka Umunna on Labour’s pre-GFC Deficit

Chuka makes some valid points in his recent Guradian article:

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/09/labours-first-step-to-regaining-power-is-to-recognise-the-mistakes-we-made

For example he acknowledges that:

” First, we spoke to our core voters but not to aspirational, middle-class ones. We talked about the bottom and top of society, about the minimum wage and zero-hour contracts, about mansions and non-doms. But we had too little to say to the majority of people in the middle.”

Partially right. “The majority of people” are in the middle. So, in a democracy, to win elections, you have to not only speak to, but also win support from,  “the majority of people”. There’s no getting away from that.

Whether Labour spoke to its core voters is a matter of opinion. I’d argue they may have spoken to them, but they didn’t listen, which is slightly different.

He also makes some invalid points. He says:

“Of course, the last Labour government should not have been running (an albeit small and historically unremarkable) deficit before the financial crash. “

The last Labour government certainly made more than a few mistakes. George Brown famously  made the ludicrous claim that he’d abolished “boom and bust”.  The period  of the Labour government  (13 years) consisted of mainly years of boom, which enabled it to achieve electoral success,  except the last 2 years were years of bust, or trying to recover from the 2008 bust, which brought about its downfall.

But did they make a mistake about the government’s deficit? The boom was caused by too much credit being created by the private sector. I don’t believe there is any dispute on that point. That credit inflated asset prices, firstly shares in the dotcom boom and then property prices in the years up to 2008.  With the benefit of hindsight what should they have done to prevent that credit bubble? They, or their so-called “independent” Bank of England,  should have increased interest rates.  If there’s too little saving and too much borrowing then interest rates should rise. Is there any dispute on that point? That would have stopped the credit bubble. No problem.

But if they’d done that there would have been a problem of the £ appreciating in value. Exports would have become uncompetitive. That, and the reduction in domestic borrowing, and therefore, spending, would have led to less economic activity. Business failures and unemployment would have risen.

So what else would the Labour Government have had to do to compensate? Run a tighter fiscal policy, with a lower deficit, or a looser fiscal policy with a higher deficit?

If you think you know the answer, please email it, with an extremely simple to understand explanation,  to:

chuka4streatham {at} gmail(.)com

PS  I’ll ask Chuka if he can provide a small cash prize for the best answer. 🙂

Are Government Bonds Just Another Form of Money?

Most mainstream economists would argue they are not. They would say  cash and bonds are not economic equivalents.  They would argue that issued money wasn’t debt but issued bonds were. A common counter argument would run as follows:

“This idea  falls apart at the local gas station…  you can’t go shopping, bar-hopping, or on vacation to Miami with a bunch of T-bills and not notice the difference compared to cash…therefore, they are NOT ECONOMIC SUBSTITUTES. Let’s be very clear here: nominal financial *value* DOES NOT EQUAL purchasing power.”

I’ve quoted here from an on-line discussion I’ve just had on this same topic.

The argument on whether bonds are, or can be considered to be money, has perhaps to be considered on several levels. Of course if we need to pay a £9 grocery bill a (genuine) £10 note will be very acceptable  to the cashier. A £10 bond, were it to exist in paper form wouldn’t be. Neither of us would know exactly what it was worth at the time. If it was close to maturity it could well be worth something close to £10 but if not, it might not be enough to cover the £9 bill. That’s the only difficulty.

The acceptability argument, though, would also fail €500 notes in Europe. They aren’t easy to spend! No-one wants them.  Does that mean they aren’t cash or even money? The best way to get rid of them is to take them into a bank where you have an account and pay them in. The cashier will probably take a note of the serial number in case there is any problem. In that respect a €500 note is no more useful than a paper bond. We’d be able to pay that into our bank account too.

To answer the question we need to consider what money is and why it has a value. To fit in with the concept of financial sector balances, money has to be classed as a liability or a debt to the issuer and an asset to the holder.

So, if we have a closed system of say 100 currency users and their ‘government’ issues 10 currency units to each, the government then has a fiancial debt/liability of 1000 currency units and the users have total assets of 1000 currency units.

The users later switch half their assets to bonds. Say they each buy, at auction, 5 cu of bonds from their government (on the promise that they will be worth, say, 10 cu at some future time) their total assets are still 1000 cu as they can trade the bonds for exactly what they paid for them between each other or even sell them back to the government, if it should have a policy of QE!

The government still has total liabilities of 1000 cu. The fact that it created new IOUs (bonds) and swapped them for its previously issued IOUs (Cash) is of little signficance. If the effective interest rate on those bonds is zero, then zero significance.

The commonly held view that cash and bonds are somehow fundamentally different probably is a hangover from gold standard days. If the government had a policy of backing its cash IOUs but not its bond IOUs with gold,  it would make some significant difference. If gold held in bank reserves by government was counted as a financial asset, then issued money wouldn’t represent any net debt, providing it was always on a strict 1:1 basis.

Of course it is arguable that gold is just a commodity like all the other commodities owned by the government and shouldn’t be counted. But if the mindset is that MONEY=GOLD it’s possible to see the logic of the alternative argument.

Eurozone electors have been sold a lemon!

Being sold a lemon means you have been tricked into buying something which is seriously defective. When you say that something is a lemon it implies that it is useless because it fails to work properly.

That’s a pretty good description of the the German dictated piece of financial engineering known as the Euro. It must rate as one of their worst ever engineering efforts. Even the much maligned East German Trabi is an engineering marvel by comparison.

Unlike the euro system, the Trabi has a starter motor to re-start the engine  after it has stalled!

The Euro, and the GSP rules that go with it, is clearly not fit for purpose. The Greek electorate is more than justified in demanding it be fixed under warranty. However, the makers have just declined, and are even insisting that the problems are all of the customer’s own making. No-one else has reported any problems! Except the Spanish, the Irish…….

There has to come a time when the buyer has to consider a  “lemon” is much more trouble than it is worth. The buyer  needs to stop making any further payments,  ask for a refund, ask for damages too,  and ultimately get rid of it.

Germans don’t understand how currency unions need to function.

The economic clash between Greece and Germany is invariably portrayed as a clash of cultures. The majority of Germans resent what they see, and are assured by those who should know better, as a bailing out, at their expense, of those in the southern peripheral European countries who appear to be unable to manage their economic affairs as well as they can.

      

That seems a perfectly commonsensical point of view but raw ‘common sense’, as always, in economics cannot be relied upon to be the best guide. Our common sense is invariably derived from our own micro-economic experience. The principle that it is better to be in surplus than deficit, for example, works fine for us as individuals in the micro world, but taking a wider view, that commonsensical notion is inconsistent with the basic accounting principle that for every asset there has to be a debt. For every surplus there has to be a deficit. Not everyone can be in surplus and not everyone can be in deficit.

So we need to correct our ‘commonsense’. Physicists, like Angela Merkel who therefore can have no excuse,  are used to doing exactly that. They know that their commonsense viewpoints of the world will only take them so far. It fails completely after that. Anyone who has studied Maxwell’s equations, Quantum Mechanics or Einstein’s Relativity knows that these subjects can make your brain hurt! After a while, we have to come to the conclusion that it is better to try to understand via the mathematics of it all rather than understand completely.

It is nowhere near as bad in economics,  but still just a little lateral thought is required. The easiest way to understand what needs to happen in the single currency eurozone, is to make a comparison with what already does happen in a successful currency union.

Let’s take a look at how it all works in the USA. The United States has, as we all know,  a common currency but also  a Federal Government to conduct macroeconomic policy, and transfer surpluses from the wealthy parts of the US to the poorer parts. It transfers surpluses. It does not arrange loans, except perhaps for special projects. If it did, the wealthier parts of the USA would end up as massive creditors. The poorer parts would end up as massive debtors. There would be clashes between New Jersey, the wealthiest state, and Mississippi the poorest.  I had to look this up , by the way. I suspected that Mississippi might be the poorest but I had no idea which was the wealthiest. I had thought maybe California. That’s as it should be. It should not be like it is in the Eurozone where the wealthy states never tire of letting everyone else know who is paying the bills.

So, imagine New Jersey  providing big loans to an impoverished Mississippi, dictating that it implement  privatisation of public assets at knock down prices and drastic cuts to state spending, pensions, its education service etc to be able to repay those loans.  The Mississipians and the New Jerseyites would be saying exactly the same things about each other as the Germans and Greeks are saying now!

So, just as any transfer of funds between New Jersey and Mississippi has to be just that, ie a transfer and not a loan,  so too it needs to be between Germany and Greece in the Eurozone.

The German taxpayers may well not like that idea. It certainly would not have been properly explained to them just what they were letting themselves in for when the Euro was created. No politician in any of the Eurozone countries would have dared make that explanation! It would have been career suicide. There were economists around who did their best to explain it all but they weren’t listened too.

It is too late for that now, but the reality of what has been created, in their name now needs to be recognised and understood by all. Some rethinking is in order. That has to start with the Germans,  then the Dutch and then everyone else too. The sooner the better.

Classical economists don’t understand real people or real economies.

There is at last some evidence that the political mainstream is coming around to the idea that  “places {in the same currency zone -PM}  in deficit have to be easily financed by places in surplus”. At least there is,  if we can consider John Redwood, a British Conservative MP,  to be representative of the mainstream. He, himself, may well question that assertion, but nevertheless this  recent quote  shows that it isn’t just Greece’s Syriza and the political left who are making the argument.

John Redwood is, of course, meaning Germany although the same argument would apply to Holland who run an even bigger surplus, as a percentage of GDP than Germany. The Germans were always happy to finance their customers when they used the DM. They’d buy up the treasury bonds of the deficit countries, like the UK and US, and that way their surpluses were recycled to their customers by the process of government deficit spending. So why the problem now? From their POV now, they should be even keener to do that. It would keep “their” trade zone healthy. They could impose conditions , of course, but there would be no reason to impose such stringent conditions as they do.

They seem wedded to the idea that internal devaluations are now needed in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone. General devaluations are no longer possible within the common currency zone. But can internal devaluations work? We know external, or general, devaluations can work. Recently the Canadian dollar has fallen by about 20% against the US dollar. This isn’t particularly noticeable to Canadians until they cross the border into the US. Then they realise that their wages and salaries are now worth 20% less, in terms of US$, than before. Canadian prices, at least the ones unaffected by import costs, such as rents, in are now 20% less too. Imports from the USA are now 100*(0.2)/(1-0.2) =25% more expensive.

This shift is necessary for the Canadian economy to adjust to changing world conditions. But what would have happened if Canadians used the US$? Theoretically,  if Canadians had reduced all prices and all wages by the same amount, and IF spending patterns were left unchanged,  the outcome would be the same. I’ve used the big IF because IF prices were falling fast then the real level of interest rates would be very high, even if they were nominally zero, and which would make it irrational for any individual to spend more than they had to.

But would that have really happened? If Canadian companies had faced falling demands for their products, they would do what all companies do. They’d cut back. But there wouldn’t be pay cuts and price cuts. Maybe just no pay rises and no price rises. They’d lay off some of their staff and stop recruiting others. They would adjust to being 20% (or close to it) smaller in this way. That would be repeated right through the Canadian economy which would end up 20% smaller too. Unemployment would skyrocket and the US media would no doubt be making negative comments about the Canadians, especially if they’d dared say it was even partially the USA’s fault.

That’s exactly what’s happened in Greece, Spain and elsewhere. Except of course it is the Euro not the US dollar which is causing the problem.  Economists, of the classical variety, will argue that this should not have happened.  Some will be in complete denial and will argue that it can’t have happened, or if it has, it must be due to some other factor. Lazy Greeks maybe? They can , of course, show nice mathematical models of how an ideal economy would be able to restore its competitiveness if only people would just behave rationally – according to their definition of rationality. But real people behave rationally as they themselves see it, not how anyone else might see it. That needs to be understood by real economists too. Including real German ordo-liberal economists!

So instead of imposing austerity on countries like Greece and Spain, to force internal devaluations, the Germans need to find some new economic advisers who can come up with some other way to equalise the money flows. Otherwise, their dream of a united Europe will become ever more nightmarish as time passes.

 

Greek debts cannot be repaid in euros!

If debts cannot be repaid they will not be repaid. Debts, in the commercial world, usually end up being settled. If they aren’t settled it is nearly always because debtors cannot pay rather than because they have chosen not to pay. There is a well recognised procedure , in civil law, recognising this truism, which can end up in the bankruptcy of the debtor if a suitable settlement with creditors cannot be satisfactorily negotiated.

Bankrupting a country, like Greece when it gets into financial difficulty,  however, is not a political option. Unless we want to start another war between Greece and Germany that is! So what are the options? Apart from carrying on, in both senses of the term, in the the present irrational manner there is only one.  If Germany (plus other countries such as Holland who also own Greek debt)  requires Greece to repay its debts,  Germany has to recognise that Greece has to pay in something other than euros, at least not directly, as it clearly does not have anywhere near enough and has fewer now after the application of the supposed economic remedy (punishment?) by the troika than it had previously.

 

 

 

Therefore, it has to pay in real goods and services:  Tourism. Olives. Feta cheese. Ouzo. Shipping. Whatever Greece makes, does and sells, Germany needs to buy to enable the debt to be settled. And it needs to buy more from Greece than it sells to Greece. That way Greece ends up with the euros, which pays the Greeks for growing the olives, running the tourist hotels, making the cheese etc . This enables Greece to provide jobs for the unemployed, improve its Government’s tax revenue base,  grow its economy, and also enables the Greeks to service, and eventually settle, their German debts.

The same naturally goes for Spain, Italy and even France. In other words, German debts get repaid when, and only when, Germany decides to accept real goods and services instead of euros. This in turn means that Germany has to run an economy more along the lines of the UK and the USA economies and import more goods and services than it exports.

If Germany and Holland don’t want to accept the reality of the situation, it is they who should exit the Euro not Greece or Spain.

Some Humour;

http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/international/greeks-apologise-with-huge-horse-2012051527146

http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/international/greeks-vote-to-stop-having-shit-kicked-out-of-them-2015012694755